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NOTE
HUGHES V. HU: TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS IN
DETERMINING CAREMARK LIABILITY FOR FOREIGN-BASED
DELAWARE INCORPORATED COMPANIES
IAN J. MURRAY*
In Hughes v. Hu,1 the Delaware Court of Chancery addressed the
Caremark liability2 of Kandi Technologies Group, Inc.,3 a Delaware
corporation that principally does business in China.4 The court5 noted that
Kandi’s board of directors did not implement nor maintain sufficient boardlevel oversight controls for the company’s accounting practices or relatedparty transactions.6 Therefore, the court correctly7 held that Kandi’s board
of directors faced a substantial threat of liability under Caremark and denied
the board’s motion to dismiss the shareholder derivative suit. 8 The court’s
decision was consistent with precedent,9 but the holding is likely to
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*
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dedicates this Note to his partner, Rachel James. Law school, and this Note in particular, would not
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encouragement, guidance, and invaluable feedback throughout the writing process. Finally, the
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assistance in publishing this Note.
1. C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
2. Caremark liability, also referred to as “Caremark claims,” arises when a director breaches
their fiduciary duty of loyalty by not making “a good faith effort to oversee the company’s
operations.” Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820–21 (Del. 2019), vacated, No. 2017-0586JRS, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 316 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018).
3. Kandi Technologies Group, Inc. is primarily in the business of developing, producing, and
distributing parts of electric vehicles. Kandi Technologies Group Inc. Profile, REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/companies/KNDI.OQ (Feb. 5, 2021, 3:59 PM). Kandi also produces offroad vehicles. Id.
4. Hughes, slip op. at 4, 28–29.
5. This Note will refer to the Delaware Court of Chancery as the “Delaware Court of
Chancery,” the “Delaware Chancery Court,” the “court of chancery,” and the “chancery court”
interchangeably, and the Delaware Supreme Court as the “Delaware Supreme Court.”
6. See infra Section I.B.
7. See infra Section IV.A.
8. Hughes, slip op. at 37–38.
9. See infra Section IV.A.
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exacerbate a recent trend.10 The trend is the avoidance of and exodus by
corporations—particularly those principally operating abroad—from
choosing Delaware as their source of corporate governance law.11 This
heightened avoidance is because the holding in Hughes represents a potential
operational incompatibility between Delaware corporate governance
standards and typical non-American business practices.12 Directors of
foreign corporations will likely see the Hughes holding as a signal for
potential litigation risks should they continue their typical business practices
and incorporate in Delaware.13
After synthesizing Delaware’s Caremark jurisprudence, this Note calls
for Delaware courts to factor in a business’s underlying market practices14
when determining the acceptable level of oversight for companies.15 This
approach would not lessen the requirements for boards under the duty of
oversight but rather allow for the Delaware courts to better assess a
company’s “good faith” efforts in meeting the duty.16 Although the Delaware
legislature could also attempt to address this issue, the Delaware courts have
the greater institutional capacity to reach case-by-case determinations.17 By
allowing for “territorial adjustments” when considering Caremark liability,
Delaware can maintain its preeminent position as an international supplier of
corporation law.18
I. THE CASE
A. The Company and the Parties
The case of Hughes v. Hu19 concerns seven members from Kandi
Technologies Group’s (the “company”) executive management and board of
directors who served during the company’s accounting control problems.20
The named defendants include the company’s CEO and chairman of its board
of directors: Xiaoming Hu; three successive CFOs: Xiaoying Zhu, Cheng

10. See infra Section IV.B.
11. See infra Section IV.B.
12. See infra notes 258–278 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 258–278 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 296–302.
15. See infra Section IV.C.
16. See infra notes 313–320 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 286–295 and accompanying text.
18. Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets
Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 393, 426 (2003) (“Delaware . . . is widely recognized as the most
significant jurisdiction for corporate-law purposes . . . .”); see infra Section IV.C.
19. C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
20. Id. at 1–2.
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Wang, and Bing Mei; and the three directors who formed the company’s
audit committee: Jerry Lewin, Henry Yu, and Liming Chen.21 The company
is a publicly-traded Delaware corporation—currently based in Jinhua,
China—specializing in manufacturing parts used in electric vehicle
production.22 The company was created via a reverse merger23 in 2007 with
a—now-defunct but still publicly listed—Delaware corporation to access
American capital markets.24 William Hughes, Jr. (“Hughes”) is a shareholder
in the company and brought this derivative suit on behalf of the company.25
B. A Timeline of Events: Sustained or Systemic Failures
Although the series of events that ultimately lead to this case span
several years, the timeline of the facts can be broken into roughly three
distinct periods.26 Section I.B.1 details the issues with the company’s
financial reports between 2010 and 2014 and the company’s resolution to
address them.27 Section I.B.2 describes the sustained problems with the
company’s financial reports after 2014 and the key admissions of
unreliability that eventually lead to this case.28 Section I.B.3 details the
plaintiff’s Section 220 request and the company’s response.29
1. Audits and Reports Between 2010 And 2014
The company’s outside auditing firm, AWC (CPA) Limited (hereinafter
“AWC”),30 identified “key audit risks” and “a key control weakness”
involving the company’s treatment of related-party transactions31—
transactions in which the parties are connected by some preexisting

21. Id. at 1–2, 18–19.
22. Id. at 4. The company is listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market under the ticker symbol,
KNDI.
Kandi Technologies Group Inc. Profile, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/
companies/KNDI.OQ (Feb. 5, 2021, 3:59 PM).
23. “Reverse [m]ergers” are a means for private companies to access American capital markets
without going through the lengthy and complex process of going public. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
INVESTOR BULLETIN: REVERSE MERGERS 1 (2011), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/
reversemergers.pdf. Generally, the public company—acting as a “shell”—acquires the private
company, and the “shareholders of the private operating company exchange their shares for a large
majority of the shares of the public company.” Id.
24. Hughes, slip op. at 4.
25. Id. at 1.
26. See infra Sections I.B.1–3.
27. See infra Section I.B.1.
28. See infra Section I.B.2.
29. See infra Section I.B.3.
30. The court appeared skeptical of the AWC’s independence as AWC had no other clients
other than the company. Hughes, slip op. at 5.
31. Id. at 5.
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means32—during its limited audit of the company’s 2010 financial statements
(the “2010 Audit”).33 In the two subsequent audits—the 2011 and 2012
audits, respectively—AWC identified additional risks.34
As part of its 2013 10-K annual report35 (“2013 10-K”), the company
disclosed that its “disclosure controls and procedures were not effective as of
December 31, 2013, due to a material weakness.”36 The company’s 2013 10K also described the company’s efforts to address the material weakness’s
contributing sources and pledged that its audit committee would review all
related-party transactions.37
The company’s audit committee38 met twice within two months of the
2013 10-K filing: once for forty-five minutes and again, three weeks later,
for forty minutes.39 During these meetings, the audit committee reviewed

32. Will
Kenton,
Related-Party
Transaction,
INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/related-partytransaction.asp (Oct. 27, 2020).
33. Hughes, slip op. at 5. Specifically, AWC found that the company recorded transactions
with one of their largest customers, Kandi USA, under a different name. Id. AWC inquired if Kandi
USA was a related party—Kandi USA is owned by the CEO’s son, Wangyuan Hu, and therefore a
related party—but received no response. Id. AWC did not follow up. Id. At the CEO’s behest,
AWC eliminated any references to Kandi USA in their audit trail by placing the questioned
transactions in another customer’s account. Id. Additionally, AWC found that the company parked
large amounts of cash in an officer’s and employee’s personal bank accounts. Id. AWC conducted
no additional investigation as to why the company placed the money in the personal bank accounts,
nor did AWC inquire if the cash constituted a disclosure worthy related-party transaction. Id. at 5–
6.
34. In the 2011 audit, AWC identified a borrower in possession of a single note valued at $33.1
million—out of a $37.9 million notes receivable balance—had not paid interest on the note in 2011.
Id. at 6–7. AWC conducted no additional evaluation of the borrower’s creditworthiness, nor did it
raise concern regarding the note’s collectability. Id. Similar to the risks identified in the “2010
Audit,” AWC’s 2012 audit (the “2012 Audit”) revealed the company had several transactions not
properly marked as related-party transactions. Id. at 7.
35. Under federal securities laws, companies must routinely disclose information to the public.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 10-K, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investingbasics/glossary/form-10-k (February 10, 2021) (“The annual report on Form 10-K provides a
comprehensive overview of the company’s business and financial condition and includes audited
financial statements.”).
36. Hughes, slip op. at 7. The court noted three factors from the 2013 10-K contributing to the
“material weakness”: (i) the company’s internal audit department head reported to its CEO and not
its audit committee; (ii) communication between the company’s internal audit department and its
audit committee was lacking; and (iii) the company did not annually evaluate the effectiveness of
its audit committee. Id. at 7–8.
37. Id. at 8.
38. Members of the audit committee at this time consisted of all three director-defendants: Yu
(chair and member since July 2011), Chen (member since May 2012), and Lewin (member since
2010). Id. at 8. Non-committee members sometimes attended audit committee meetings; however,
the core composition did not change during the time in question. Id. at 8–9, 11–12
39. Id. at 8–9.
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and approved a suite of items related to company matters.40 The company
failed to produce documents from either of these meetings in response to the
plaintiff’s Section 220 demand.41 In July 2014, the audit committee chair
reviewed the remediation measures with management, the company’s
internal audit team, and AWC.42 In its November 2014 disclosure, the
company determined that the new internal controls “were effective” as of
September 30, 2014.43
2. Audits and Reports Post-2014
The audit committee next met one year later, on March 13, 2015, to
review and approve the company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K for the 2014
calendar year (the “2014 10-K”).44 In fifty minutes, the committee reviewed
the company’s year-end financial results and approved a “Policy of Relatedparty Transaction Relating to JV Shareholder.”45 Three weeks after the 2014
10-K was filed, the company’s board of directors—via unanimous written
consent—adopted a sweeping set of resolutions.46
The audit committee’s next meeting—lasting thirty minutes—was on
March 7, 2016, to review and approve the company’s Annual Report on Form
10-K for the 2015 calendar year (the “2015 10-K”).47 At this meeting, the
company’s management represented that the company did not engage in any
related-party transactions with Kandi USA during 2015.48 However,
company management did report that the company engaged in related-party
sales with the service company, describing those transactions as mainly
40. During the first meeting, the audit committee reviewed both “matters relating to relationship
transaction[s],” documents regarding the company’s contract with Eliteway, and potential
procedures for approval of “relationship transaction[s].” Id. at 8–9. During the latter meeting, the
audit committee reviewed and approved a new “Internal Audit Activity Charter’” and a new
“Management Policy on Related-Party Transactions.” Id. at 9.
41. Id. at 9, 18. Requests pursuant to Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law
allows shareholders to inspect “for any proper purpose” the business’s books and records. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2020).
42. Hughes, slip op. at 10.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 11. There were no meetings of the audit committee between the 2014 10-K meeting
and the meeting on May 30, 2014. Id. at 9, 11.
45. Id. at 11. At the 2014 10-K’s filing, two days after its review, the company again described
its disclosure controls and procedures as “effective.” Id.
46. Id. The court drew attention to three resolutions in particular: (i) the audit committee, as
well as then-director Ni Guangzheng, qualified as independent directors for NASDAQ listing
purposes; (ii) Yu and Lewin qualified as audit committee financial experts; and (iii) retaining AWC
as the company’s independent auditor for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2015. Id. at 11–12.
47. Id. at 12. Again, the audit committee had no recorded meetings between the 2014 10-K
meeting and the 2015 10-K meeting. Id. at 11–12.
48. Id. at 12–13.
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involving “battery sales.”49 On March 14, 2016, the company filed its 2015
10-K.50 The company again described its disclosure controls and procedures
as “effective.”51 Within two weeks of filing the 2015 10-K, the company’s
audit committee—via unanimous written consent—approved a different
description of the related-party transactions between the company and the
service company.52
On April 12, 2016, the company’s board of directors immediately
replaced AWC with BDO China Shu Lun Pan CPAs (“BDO”) as the
company’s auditor.53 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the
“PCAOB”) brought disciplinary proceedings against AWC for AWC’s
handling of the 2010, 2011, and 2012 audits shortly after the company
replaced its auditor (the “PCAOB Orders”). 54 The PCAOB Orders prompted
NASDAQ to request that the company verify its cash balances.55
The audit committee reviewed the company’s Quarterly Report on Form
10-Q56 on August 1, 2016, for one hour.57 The committee also discussed
BDO’s cash balance audit, the company’s related-party transactions from the
last six months,58 and the Chinese Government’s delay in subsidy payments
to the joint venture.59
In November 2016, the company disclosed that it had engaged in
material transactions with Kandi USA—under its trade name Eliteway—in

49. Id. The service company was Zhejiang ZuoZhongYou Electric Vehicle Service Co., Ltd.
Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 13.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 13. The consent approved related-party transactions with the service company—
totaling $42,032,060—and authorized management to conduct related-party transactions with the
service company for the remainder of 2016. Id.
53. Id. at 14.
54. Id.
55. Id. BDO began the audit on July 11, 2016, and, at the inquiry of Lewin on the company’s
audit committee, reported no adverse findings. Id.
56. Unlike the annual filing of the Form 10-K, the Form 10-Q is filed quarterly and consists of
“unaudited financial statements” which provide “a continuing view of the company’s financial
position
during
the
year.”
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
FORM
10-Q,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/form-10-q
(February
10, 2021).
57. Hughes, slip op. at 15.
58. The company’s only reported related-party transactions were with the service company. Id.
at 15.
59. Id. The Chinese government phased out the subsidy program in September 2016 after
investigations showed that Chinese manufacturers had structured their operations in a way to receive
subsidies for both producers and purchasers of electric vehicles. Id.
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2012.60 The company also disclosed additional related-party transactions—
totaling $10.4 million as of December 31, 2016—with the service company.61
In March 2017, the company announced that financial statements
between 2014 through the third quarter of 2016 “could not be relied upon and
needed to be restated” (the “March 2017 Announcement”).62 The company
committed to providing restatement financial statements.63 Shortly following
the March 2017 Announcement, the company filed its Annual Report on
Form 10-K for the 2016 calendar year.64 It disclosed that the company lacked
both “sufficient expertise” in financial statement reporting techniques and
“effective controls” to classify certain cash and non-cash activities
properly.65
3. Section 220 submission
As a result of both the March 2017 Announcement and 2016 10-K, on
May 10, 2017, Hughes sought to inspect the company’s books and records.66
After the company initially declined to respond, Hughes filed for compliance
in the Delaware Chancery Court.67 After protracted negotiations, the
company’s board of directors provided some documents.68 However, the
company stipulated that any remaining requested materials “either do not
exist or had been withheld on privilege grounds.”69

60. Id. at 16. The company claimed that these transactions were conducted at “arm’s length.”
Id. An arm’s-length transaction is “[a] transaction between two unrelated and unaffiliated parties,”
or “[a] transaction between two parties, however closely related they may be, conducted as if the
parties were strangers, so that no conflict of interest arises.” Transaction, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
61. Hughes, slip op. at 16.
62. Id. After the company made the March 2017 Announcement, four securities class actions
and one derivative lawsuit were filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York. In re Kandi Techs. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 17 Civ. 1944 (ER), 2019 WL 4918649, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2019); Hughes, slip op. at 18. The district court dismissed the securities class
actions holding that the plaintiffs did not plead sufficiently particular facts that would support the
required strong inference of scienter. In re Kandi Techs. Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2019 WL 4918649,
at *3–6.
63. Hughes, slip op. at 16.
64. Id. at 17.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 17–18; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2020).
67. Hughes, slip op. at 18.
68. Id. at 3, 18.
69. Id. at 3 (quoting Hughes v. Kandi Techs. Grp., Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0700-JTL, Dkt. 24,
Stipulation of Dismissal With Prejudice, at 2).
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C. Procedural History of Current Litigation
On February 14, 2019, Hughes filed suit in the Delaware Court of
Chancery, alleging that the defendants “individually and collectively,
breached their fiduciary duties by willfully failing to maintain an adequate
system of oversight, disclosure controls and procedures, and internal controls
over financial reporting.”70 Hughes also alleged that the defendants were
unjustly enriched by receiving bonuses tied to the inaccurate financial
reporting.71 The defendants denied the allegations and moved to dismiss the
complaint under Court of Chancery rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6).72 On April 27,
the court denied the defendants’ motions for dismissal, permitting the case to
move forward.73
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
“Caremark claims” are a subset of shareholder derivative suits available
under Delaware law.74 Caremark claims allow shareholders, on behalf of the
corporation, to bring action against directors who either failed to implement
or properly monitor systems of oversight.75 Section II.A discusses the origins
and requirements of shareholder derivative suits under Delaware law.76
Should shareholders decide that demand[ing] the board to act—a requirement
for shareholder derivative suits—would be futile, the shareholders must plead
why the court should excuse this requirement.77 Section II.B reviews the
current tests that Delaware courts use to evaluate “demand futility.”78
Section II.C examines the foundation and evolution of Caremark claims.79
Section II.D surveys Delaware courts’ current jurisprudence of Caremark
claims.80

70. Id. at 18–19.
71. Id. at 19.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 40.
74. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (describing how a “failure to act in good
faith” can in turn lead to a company’s director violating their duty of loyalty); Louisiana Mun. Police
Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 340 (Del. Ch. 2012) (“A breach of fiduciary duty claim that
seeks to hold directors accountable for the consequences of a corporate trauma is known colloquially
as a Caremark claim . . . .”).
75. Hughes, slip op. at 1, 21, 29–31.
76. See infra Section II.A.
77. See e.g., Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932–34 (Del. 1993) (describing the demand
requirement and under what circumstances it can be excused).
78. See infra Section II.B.
79. See infra Section II.C.
80. See infra Section II.D.
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A. Shareholder Derivative Suits
Under Delaware corporation law, a company is managed by its duly
elected board of directors.81 While the directors are responsible for the
corporation’s affairs, shareholders are not left powerless to address
transgressions made by the board against the corporation.82 However, a
shareholder’s ability to bring derivative suits is restricted by several
procedural requirements.83 Section II.A.1 details the history and creation of
shareholder derivative suits.84 Section II.A.2 discusses the various “standing
requirements” that shareholders must overcome before they can bring a
shareholder derivative suit.85
1. Origin of Derivative Suits
Under longstanding American jurisprudence, “[c]orporations are
creatures of state law, and . . . state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation.”86 Delaware’s corporation law—of which Kandi is bound by
because it is incorporated in Delaware87—provides that shareholders elect the
company’s board of directors88 to manage the corporation’s affairs in the
shareholders’ stead.89 The practical effect of this arrangement is the
separation of ownership (shareholders) and control (directors)—which in
turn allows for more traditional corporate characteristics such as limited
liability.90 This exchange in power has additional consequences for
directors.91 Directors gain a “triad” of fiduciary duties aimed at protecting
both the interests of the corporation and the best interests of its

81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141(a), 142(a), 211(b) (2020).
82. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
83. See infra Section II.A.2.
84. See infra Section II.A.1.
85. See infra Section II.A.2.
86. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (quoting Cort. v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84
(1975)).
87. Hughes, slip op. at 1.
88. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2020).
89. Id. § 141(a) (“The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.”). Actual day-to-day
management of the corporation is typically done by a selection of officers by the board. Id. § 142(a).
90. See Lynda J. Oswald, Bifurcation of the Owner and Operator Analysis Under CERCLA, 72
WASH. U. L. Q. 223, 233 n.43 (1994) (discussing the corporate form and how the corporation is a
“separate and distinct” entity from its shareholders).
91. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) (“The existence and exercise of this
power carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its
shareholders.” (citing Loft, Inc. v. Guth, 2 A.2d 225 (Del. Ch. 1938), aff’d, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939)).
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shareholders.92 Delaware courts have extrapolated from these fiduciary
duties a presumption that directors’ business decisions must be made on both
an informed and “good faith” basis.93 This presumption is called the
“business judgment rule,” which functionally serves as a powerful defense
when directors’ business decisions are questioned by shareholders.94
Shareholders primarily exercise control over directors’ actions through
their power to elect, retain, and remove the company’s directors;95 however,
shareholders are not powerless when directors’ actions harm the
corporation.96 Through shareholder derivative suits, shareholders have the
codified right to try and bring actions on behalf of the corporation itself.97
However, shareholders of Delaware incorporated companies must overcome
several arduous common law and statutory procedural requirements to pursue
such a remedy.98

92. Compare Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (stating that the three
fiduciary duties are the duty of loyalty, the duty of care, and the duty of good faith), with Stone v.
Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (“[T]he obligation to act in good faith does not establish an
independent fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.”).
93. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (“[P]resumption that in making a business decision, the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the company.” (quoting Aronson, 473
A.2d at 812)).
94. Id. at 361 (“The rule posits a powerful presumption in favor of actions taken by the directors
in that a decision made by a loyal and informed board will not be overturned by the courts unless it
cannot be ‘attributed to any rational business purpose.’” (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971))).
95. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2020). Under Delaware law, shareholders are also
permitted to vote on matters such as the approval of charter or by-law amendments. Id. § 109(a).
96. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811.
97. Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 454–59 (1882) (discussing the early English and
American case law regarding shareholder derivative suits). The nature of these suits are either “the
equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to compel the corporation to sue” or “a suit by the
corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those liable to it.” Aronson, 473
A.2d at 811. Shareholder derivative suits are inherently incongruent with the notion that directors
are empowered to manage the business and affairs of the corporation and, as such, a shareholder’s
right to seek such a remedy is limited to two situations: “(i) the stockholder has demanded that the
directors pursue the corporate claim and they have wrongfully refused to do so or (ii) demand is
excused because the directors are incapable of making an impartial decision regarding the
litigation.” Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 21 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) (citing
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932 (Del. 1993)). Federal and state governments, including
Delaware, have codified the shareholders’ power to seek derivative actions. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.;
DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1.
98. See infra Sections II.A.2., II.B.
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2. Standing Requirements for Shareholder Derivative Suits under
Delaware Corporation Law
To prevail in a shareholder derivative suit, a shareholder must first show
that they were a shareholder at the time of the challenged transaction(s).99
The shareholder must also maintain ownership throughout the litigation.100
Second, the shareholder must show that their action adequately represents the
corporation’s interest and fellow shareholders.101 The third and final
procedural hurdle that shareholders must overcome is the demand
requirement.102
Upon receiving the shareholder demand, the board can choose to file the
suit itself—resolving the matter—or to reject the demand.103 However, a
rejected demand does not waste the shareholder’s single “arrow.”104 If the
shareholder can convince the court that the board wrongly rejected their
demand,105 the shareholder maintains “the right to bring the underlying
action.”106 In Delaware, shareholders can also overcome the demand

99. This requirement of share ownership is found both in the Delaware Court of Chancery rules
as well as codified in the Delaware General Corporation law, with near identical language. DEL.
CH. CT. R. 23.1(a); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327. Delaware, unlike some states, do not require a
minimum ownership stake in order to bring a derivative suit. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §
7-107-402(3) (2021) (allowing for a shareholder owning less than a prescribed amount of stock to
post bond); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 627 (2020) (allowing the same).
100. Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1036 (Del. 2004).
101. Id. at 1036–39. Delaware law categorizes shareholder cases based on “where the recovery
. . . flows”: direct or derivative. Id. at 1036. The cases are separated by a two-question inquiry.
First, “who suffered the alleged harm (the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually)?” Id.
at 1033. Second, “who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy (the corporation
or the stockholders, individually)?” Id. Should the plaintiff-shareholder adequately show that the
action is derivative in nature, the shareholder bringing the suit must submit an affidavit disclaiming
that they have not, nor will they, receive any benefit from serving as the representative party. DEL.
CH. CT. R. 23.1(a)–(b).
102. DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) (“The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable
authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”).
The demand requirement seeks to maintain a fundamental precept of Delaware corporation law—
that directors, not shareholders, run the company—by requiring shareholders to first exhaust their
“intracorporate remedies.” Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811–12.
103. In re infoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 985–86 (Del. Ch. 2007).
104. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1218–19 (Del. 1996) (“If a demand is made, the
stockholder has spent one—but only one—’arrow’ in the ‘quiver.’ The spent ‘arrow’ is the right to
claim that demand is excused. The stockholder does not, by making demand, waive the right to
claim that demand has been wrongfully refused.”).
105. See infra Section II.B.
106. Grimes, 673 A.2d at 1219.
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requirement by showing that their demand on the board would be futile,
otherwise known as “demand futility.”107
B. Overcoming the Demand Rule (“Demand Futility”)
Although Delaware courts are deferential to directors’ business
judgments,108 they are also cognizant that external influence
“sterilizes . . . discretion” and prevents directors from being considered
“proper persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation.”109 As
such, two fact-specific110 inquiries—based on separate but related factual
scenarios—have arisen in Delaware corporate jurisprudence to determine if
demand is futile.111 These two inquiries are known as the Aronson112 and
Rales113 tests, respectively.
1. When the Current and Challenged Board is the Same
In the seminal case, Aronson v. Lewis,114 the Delaware Supreme Court
considered a situation where the directors who approved the challenged
transaction were the same directors who would consider a demand.115 The
court devised a two-pronged test specifically for this factual situation.116 The
first prong of the Aronson test examines “the independence and
disinterestedness of the directors,”117 while the second prong reviews the

107. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (“The rule emerging from these decisions is that where officers
and directors are under an influence which sterilizes their discretion, they cannot be considered
proper persons to conduct litigation on behalf of the corporation. Thus, demand would be futile.”).
108. See id. at 812 (“Absent an abuse of discretion, that [‘business’] judgment will be respected
by the courts.”).
109. Id. at 814. But see id. at 815. (“[T]he mere threat of personal liability for approving a
questioned transaction, standing alone, is insufficient to challenge either the independence or
disinterestedness of directors . . . .”).
110. Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008). Delaware courts routinely express that
when considering a demand’s futility, any reasonable inference draw in the plaintiff-shareholder’s
favor must be drawn from “particularized facts” and “inferences that are not objectively reasonable
cannot be drawn in the plaintiff’s favor.” See id. (citing Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living
Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004)).
111. Id.
112. See infra Section II.B.1.
113. See infra Section II.B.2.
114. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
115. Id. at 808–12; Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 22–23 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27,
2020).
116. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814
117. Id. The court went on to say that should there be an “‘interested’ director transaction, such
that the business judgment rule is inapplicable to the board majority approving the transaction, then
the inquiry ceases.” Id. at 815. Under such circumstances—not being under the protection of the
business judgment rule—directors face significant risk from the suit. Id.; Hughes, slip op. at 23.
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“alleged wrong . . . against the factual background alleged in the
complaint.”118
The court rejected the notion that:
[A]ny board approval of a challenged transaction automatically
connotes “hostile interest” and “guilty participation” by directors,
or some other form of sterilizing influence upon them. Were that
so, the demand requirements of our law would be meaningless,
leaving the clear mandate of Chancery Rule 23.1 devoid of its
purpose and substance.119
Moreover, the court held that the shareholders must establish
“reasonable doubt,” by the allegation of “particularized facts,” in both the
notion that the directors were ”disinterested and independent”120 and that the
“challenged transaction was . . . a valid exercise of business judgment.”121
2. When the Board has Changed after the Challenged Conduct
Because the Aronson test covered a factually specific situation,122 it did
not transpose well to cases where the “board had not acted or where the
board’s membership had changed.”123 As such, in Rales v. Blasband,124 the
Delaware Supreme Court readdressed the demand futility question where
“the test enunciated in [Aronson] is not implicated.”125 In Rales, the board
that considered the demand was not the same board that had made the

118. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
119. Id.
120. Directors are considered “interested” when they will receive a personal benefit from a
transaction, and the shareholders do not equally benefit. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 936 (Del.
1993). Directors can also be “interested” where they are not independent of someone whom is
“interested” in the challenged transaction. Hughes, slip op. at 25–26.
121. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. The Hughes court put it succinctly, “[t]he central legal question
was therefore whether the complaint’s allegations about the directors’ involvement in the decision
to approve the challenged transaction rendered them incapable of making an impartial decision
regarding whether to institute litigation concerning the transaction.” Hughes, slip op. at 22.
122. See Hughes, slip op. at 24 (noting that the Aronson test only addressed situations where
“the same board that would consider a demand had made the decision being challenged in the
derivative suit”).
123. Id.
124. 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993).
125. Id. at 930 (emphasis added). Although the court was explicit in saying that “a court should
not apply the Aronson test for demand futility where the board that would be considering the demand
did not make a business decision which is being challenged,” the court further elaborated the
“principle scenarios” in which not to apply the Aronson test: (1) where a majority of the directors
who made the challenged decision have been replaced; (2) the subject of the derivative suit is not a
business decision of the board; and (3) where the challenged decision was made by the board of a
different corporation. Id. at 933–34.
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underlying challenged decision.126 To address this issue, the court articulated
a more comprehensive demand futility test:
[W]hether or not the particularized factual allegations of a
derivative stockholder complaint create a reasonable doubt that, as
of the time the complaint is filed, the board of directors could have
properly exercised its independent and disinterested business
judgment in responding to a demand. If the derivative plaintiff
satisfies this burden, then demand will be excused as futile.127
The court also explained a two-step process when a board responds to a
stockholder demand letter.128 First, the directors must “determine the best
method to inform themselves of the facts relating to the alleged wrongdoing
and the considerations.”129 Next, the board must consider the “alternatives
available to it, including the advisability of implementing internal corrective
action and commencing legal proceedings.”130
Delaware courts have noted that the Rales and Aronson tests essentially
seek to accomplish the same task—determining directors’ impartiality.131
However, Delaware courts have further expressed that while Rales is not a
“universal demand requirement,”132 the more broadly articulated test does
provide a “cleaner, more straightforward formulation to probe the core issue
in the demand futility” analysis.133

126. Id. at 930–31.
127. Id. at 934 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 935. This process must also be done “free of personal financial interest and improper
extraneous influences.” Id.
129. Id. The court noted that should a factual investigation be required, it must be conducted
“reasonably and in good faith.” Id. (citing Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 213 (Del. 1991)); Spiegel
v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990).
130. Rales, 634 A.2d at 935; see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984)
(discussing the role of the demand requirement as a “form of alternate dispute resolution” that
requires the stockholder to exhaust “his intracorporate remedies”).
131. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 27 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
132. Sandys v. Pincus, C.A. No. 9512-CB, 2016 WL 769999, at *13 n.60 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29,
2016), rev’d, 152 A.3d 124, 134 (Del. 2016) (reversing the chancery court’s dismissal under rule
23.1 and remanding for further proceedings).
133. Id. at *13. The court further elaborated that the core issue in demand futility analysis is,
“whether there is a reason to doubt the impartial[ity] of the directors, who hold the authority under
8 Del. C. § 141(a) to decide [for the corporation] whether to initiate, or refrain from entering,
litigation.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Teamsters Union
25, 119 A.3d 44, 67 (Del. Ch. 2015)); see Hughes, slip op. at 26–27, 27 n.2 (claiming, and providing
ample supporting case law, that the more broadly articulated Rales test “supersedes and
encompasses” the more “special application” Aronson test).
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C. The Duty of Oversight and “Caremark” Claims
As noted above, shareholder derivative suits are a means under
Delaware corporation law for shareholders to try and bring actions on behalf
of the corporation itself when the board has violated one of its fiduciary
duties.134
As such, the board is subject to various “standing”
135
requirements —one of which is the previously discussed “Demand
Rule.”136 In situations where the plaintiff can show that their demand on the
board would be futile, a shareholder may bring a derivative suit.137 One type
of shareholder derivative suit—spawned from the broad’s duty of
oversight—is the “Caremark claim.”138 Section II.C.1 discusses the history
surrounding the creation of the duty of oversight and the subsequently created
Caremark liability.139 Section II.C.2 details how the duty of oversight’s
intellectual underpinnings have shifted over the years.140 Lastly, Section
II.C.3 examines the specific parameters of the duty of oversight.141
1. Acceptance of Caremark Liability
Foundationally, directors are bound by specific fiduciary duties “to
protect the interests of the corporation and to act in the best interests of its
shareholders.”142 Courts, acting as a proxy for societal expectations, have
imposed additional duties on boards as views of corporate board
responsibilities have morphed over time.143 The most prominent of these new
duties is the aptly named “duty of oversight.”144
In the seminal case In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation,145 the Delaware Court of Chancery accepted what the Graham v.
134. See supra Section I.A.1.
135. See supra Section II.A.
136. See supra Section II.B.
137. Hughes, slip op. at 21.
138. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (describing how a “failure to act in good
faith” can in turn lead to a company’s director violating their duty of loyalty).
139. See infra Section II.C.1.
140. See infra Section II.C.2.
141. See infra Section II.C.3.
142. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 360–61 (Del. 1993) (citing Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5
A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)). The court further identified the three fiduciary duties: the duty of
loyalty, the duty of care, and the duty of good faith. Id. at 361.
143. See infra notes 153–160 and accompanying text. See generally Dalia T. Mitchell, The
Import of History to Corporate Law, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 683, 688–92 (2015) (discussing the
“revolution” during the 1970’s and 1980’s in director duties and responsibilities).
144. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). While all
referencing the same duty, the “duty of oversight” has been called by other names such as “duty to
monitor.” Mitchell, supra note 143, at 684.
145. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. 146 court rejected thirty-three years
earlier.147 Graham was a derivative suit against the company’s directors for
damages caused by violations of federal antitrust laws.148 The court—
treating the case like a torts case149—found that the board’s activity was
wholly limited to “matters concerning the general business policy of the
company,” given that the company’s decentralized nature made board-level
considerations of “specific problems” impracticable.150
In a final
proclamation, the Graham court noted that “absent cause for suspicion there
is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate system of
espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect
exists.”151
Thirty-three years later in In re Caremark, the Delaware Court of
Chancery reevaluated Graham’s pronouncement on the board’s duty to
establish systems of monitoring.152 Chancellor Allen elaborated that a “broad
generalization” of Graham’s holding153 would not be accepted by the, thencurrent, Delaware Supreme Court.154 Chancellor Allen noted that recent
Delaware Supreme Court jurisprudence155 demonstrated the “seriousness
with which the corporation law views the role of the corporate board,”156 and
that “relevant and timely information” was a necessary component to the

146. 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
147. Compare In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 969–70 (discussing that directors have a duty
to “assure that a corporate information gathering and reporting systems exists”), with Graham, 188
A.2d at 130 (“[A]bsent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate
a corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect
exists.”).
148. Graham, 188 A.2d at 127.
149. Id. at 130 (“[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use
that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances.”);
see Mitchell, supra note 143, at 683–84 (discussing that early duty of care cases had origins in torts).
150. Graham, 188 A.2d at 128.
151. Id. at 130 (emphasis added).
152. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 969–70.
153. Chancellor Allen stated the following:
Can it be said today that, absent some ground giving rise to suspicion of violation of law,
that corporate directors have no duty to assure that a corporate information gathering and
reporting systems exists which represents a good faith attempt to provide senior
management and the Board with information respecting material acts, events or
conditions within the corporation, including compliance with applicable statutes and
regulations?
Id. at 969.
154. Id. at 969–70.
155. Id. at 970 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).
156. Id.
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board’s “supervisory and monitoring role” under Delaware Corporate law.157
In total, these recent developments meant that for a board to “satisfy their
obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation,” the board
had an affirmative duty to ensure systematic monitoring.158
Chancellor Allen’s final action was to find a proper fiduciary home for
this new duty of oversight. 159 In a judicial two-step, Chancellor Allen noted
that the board’s obligation of oversight was a “duty to attempt in good faith
to assure that a . . . reporting system . . . [was] adequate,”160 and that the duty
of good faith was a “core element of any . . . duty of care inquiry.”161
However, Caremark did not overturn Graham, and therefore, Chancellor
Allen’s extensive description of this new “duty of oversight” was almost
entirely dicta.162 It would take another thirteen years for the duty articulated
in Caremark to become law.163 The Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v.
Ritter164 set forth the two prongs that would become the basis for Caremark
claims: “(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or
information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or
controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus
157. Id. (noting that “relevant and timely information” was required for the execution of the
board’s “supervisory and monitoring role” under Section 141 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law. Chancellor Allen also noted the federal organizational sentencing guidelines on business
organizations were indicative of a duty of oversight. Id. (“Any rational person attempting in good
faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility would be bound to take into account this
development and the enhanced penalties and the opportunities for reduced sanctions that it offers.”).
See generally Paul E. McGreal, Caremark in the Arc of Compliance History, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 647,
648 (2018) (discussing the 1991 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ influence on the Caremark decision).
158. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 970.
159. Id. at 968–70.
160. Id. at 970.
161. Id. at 968 (emphasis added). Placing the duty of oversight within the duty of care meant
that this new duty would be subject to the business judgment rule; therefore, as long as the board
exercised “good faith” in establishing and running the newly required monitoring systems, the board
would not be held “liable for [its] failure to reveal violations of law or duties by officers or
employees.” Mitchell, supra note 143, at 693. The court elaborated on the level of detail such
systems would require:
Obviously[,] the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system is a
question of business judgment. And obviously too, no rationally designed information
and reporting system will remove the possibility that the corporation will violate laws or
regulations, or that senior officers or directors may nevertheless sometimes be misled or
otherwise fail reasonably to detect acts material to the corporation’s compliance with the
law.
In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 970.
162. Graham was a decision from the Delaware Supreme Court, and as such, Chancellor Allen
had no authority to overturn Graham. Id. at 969. See generally Todd Haugh, Caremark’s
Behavioral Legacy, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 611, 616, 618 (stating that Chancellor Allen employed
“extensive use of dicta to ‘author a mini-treatise’ on oversight liability”).
163. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 364–65 (Del. 2006).
164. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006).
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disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring
their attention.”165
2. Shifting of the Duty of Oversight
In the time between Caremark and Stone, the several intellectual
underpinnings of the duty of oversight significantly changed.166 The duty of
oversight’s ancestral home, as established in Caremark, was within the duty
of care.167 But shortly before Caremark’s acceptance in Stone, the Delaware
Supreme Court—based on the “plain and intentional terms” of Caremark—
moved the duty of oversight within the duty of loyalty. 168 This Guttman v.
Huang169 articulation of the duty of oversight’s home is what the Stone court
accepts verbatim.170
The underlying requirement to “act in good faith” followed the duty of
oversight’s move to its new home within the duty to loyalty.171 Yet the court
did not further define the duty to act in good faith.172 The Delaware Supreme
Court in In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation173 provided the
“conceptual guidance” as to the meaning of “good faith” in the corporate
context.174 Specifically, the court observed that there are at least three
categories of good faith.175 All three categories require the fiduciary to either
act intentionally without the corporation’s best interests in mind or to

165. Id. at 370.
166. See infra notes 168–177 and accompanying text.
167. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996).
168. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. 2003) (“Although the Caremark decision is
rightly seen as a prod towards the greater exercise of care . . . its plain and intentional
terms . . . articulates a standard for liability for failures of oversight . . . that the directors breached
their duty of loyalty . . . .”).
169. 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003).
170. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70 (quoting Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34).
171. Id. at 369–70 (calling the requirement to act in good faith “‘a subsidiary element’ . . . ’of
the fundamental duty of loyalty’”) (quoting Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506 n.34). In Caremark, the court
famously said that “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition.” In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at
971.
172. In re Caremark Int’l, 698 A.2d at 971; see Mitchell, supra note 143, at 697–99 (discussing
that by “reintroduc[ing]” the concept of good faith,” the Delaware courts then had the task of
defining it).
173. 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
174. Id. at 64–65.
175. Id. at 67. The first category is “where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.” Id. The second occurs “where the
fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law.” Id. The third occurs “where the
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for his duties.” Id.
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disregard their duties.176 Similar to Stone’s incorporation of Guttman, Stone
incorporated Walt Disney’s definitions of good faith177 into its final
articulation of the duty of oversight.178
3. Business Risk vs. Legal Risk
Three years after the acceptance of Caremark claims in Stone, the
Delaware Chancery Court gave additional guidance on the duty of
oversight’s parameters.179 In In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative
Litigation,180 shareholders claimed that the board breached its fiduciary
duties by failing to monitor the potential risk, which resulted in significant
losses arising from the company’s exposure to the subprime lending
market.181 Ultimately, the Citigroup court found that the losses were a result
of “business risk.”182 Therefore the business judgment rule would shield the
directors unless the shareholders could show that the directors were acting
without “good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company.”183 The court noted that—to grant the kind of
“judicial second guessing” the plaintiffs were asking for—it would have to
“abandon such bedrock principles of Delaware fiduciary duty law.”184
Regarding the plaintiff’s complaint, Chancellor Chandler stated in the
opinion that the “[p]laintiffs’ theory . . . [was] a bit of a twist on the traditional
Caremark claim.185 Moreover, Chancellor Chandler sharply noted that there
is a “significant difference[] between failing to oversee employee fraudulent
176. Id.
177. The Stone court referred to “good faith” by articulating it in the negative. Stone v. Ritter,
911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006). The Stone court invoked the second definition of bad faith in Walt
Disney. Id. at 369–70. See generally Ann M. Scarlett, Imitation or Improvement? The Evolution
of Shareholder Derivative Litigation in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia,
28 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 569, 589 (2011) (discussing Stone’s interpretation and
incorporation of good faith in the newly accepted duty of oversight).
178. Stone, 911 A.2d at 369–70.
179. See infra notes 180–188 and accompanying text.
180. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
181. Id. at 111.
182. Id. at 123–25.
183. Id. at 124–25. In a particularly damning excerpt, the court stated that “[w]hen one looks
past the lofty allegations of duties of oversight and red flags used to dress up these claims, what is
left appears to be plaintiff shareholders attempting to hold the director defendants personally liable
for making (or allowing to be made) business decisions that, in hindsight, turned out poorly.” Id. at
124. The court opined that “[i]t is almost impossible for a court, in hindsight, to determine whether
the directors of a company properly evaluated risk” and that “[i]n any investment there is a chance
that returns will turn out lower than expected.” Id. at 126.
184. Id. at 126.
185. Id. at 123 (“In a typical Caremark case, plaintiffs argue that the defendants are liable for
damages that arise from a failure to properly monitor or oversee employee misconduct or violations
of law.”).
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or criminal conduct [“legal risk”] and failing to recognize the extent of a
Company’s business risk.186 The Citigroup decision not only reaffirmed that
cases of “business risk” are exceedingly difficult to prosecute under
Caremark jurisprudence,187 but also seemingly narrowed the scope of
Caremark claims to only those involving “legal risk.”188
D. Current “loosening” of “Caremark” Claims
In the seminal Caremark case, the Delaware Chancery Court noted that
its newly created theory was “possibly the most difficult theory in
corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment.”189
Since the acceptance of Caremark claims in Stone,190 this prophetic
pronouncement has mostly been accurate, with the majority of cases resolved
through summary judgment in favor of the directors.191 However, in recent
years the Delaware Chancery Court appears to be increasing the
“survivability” of Caremark claims.192
This trend in increased “survivability” began a year before Hughes v.
Hu,193 as the Delaware Courts began to consider the potential inferences that
could be drawn when a board does not adequately oversee industry specific
compliance risks.194 In Marchand v. Barnhill195—the first case in this
increased “survivability” trend—the Delaware Supreme Court held that when
a board fails to inform itself of “compliance issue[s] intrinsically critical to
186. Id. at 131 (“While it may be tempting to say that directors have the same duties to
monitor and oversee business risk, imposing Caremark-type duties on directors to monitor
business risk is fundamentally different.”).
187. Id. (“Oversight duties under Delaware law are not designed to subject directors . . . to
personal liability for failure to predict the future and to properly evaluate business risk.”)
188. See In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 395872, at *17 (Del.
Ch. June 26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016) (“Pleadings, even specific pleadings, indicating
that directors did a poor job of overseeing risk in a poorly-managed corporation do not imply
director bad faith.”); In re Dow Chem. Derivative Litig., No. 4349-CC, 2010 WL 66769, at *9–10
(Del. Ch. Jan. 11, 2010) (affirming Citigroup’s strict approach to oversight liability).
189. In re Caremark Int’l Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
190. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).
191. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 131 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(failing to survive a motion to dismiss by defendants). But see, e.g., In re China Agritech, Inc.
S’holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 7163-VCL, 2013 WL 2181514, at *27 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2013)
(surviving motion to dismiss brought by defendants). See generally Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate
Oversight and Disobedience, 72 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 2036–37, 2045 (2019) (describing that the
low survival rate of these cases are due to some combination of the exacting pleading requirements
and low standard for “good faith” oversight).
192. See infra notes 195–205 and accompanying text.
193. C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
194. See infra notes 195–205 and accompanying text.
195. 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) vacated, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 316 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27, 2018)
(missing plaintiffs’ Caremark claims).
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the company’s business operation” it is proper to make an inference of bad
faith by the board.196 Furthermore, the court stressed that while the board can
rely on management,197 the duty of oversight means that (at a minimum) the
board must “exercise its duty of care” in creating systems of monitoring and
reporting on “the corporation’s central compliance risks.”198
Just a few months later, in In re Clovis, Inc. Derivative Litigation,199 the
Delaware Court of Chancery refined Marchand’s notion of “‘mission
critical’ . . . risk”200 to include the “regulatory environments in which their
businesses operate,” particularly, impositions created by “positive law.”201
The In re Clovis court’s “expansion“ of Caremark liability still incorporates
the protections of the business judgment rule202 while limiting the board’s
discretion concerning regulatory mandates.203 The court noted that although
a “board’s oversight function must be more rigorously exercised” when the
“company operates in an environment [with] externally imposed
regulations,” that oversight need not be “omniscien[t]” but rather a “good
faith effort.”204
The court also touched on the notion that although managers run the
day-to-day operations of corporations—and therefore are presumably more
knowledgeable about on-the-ground matters—management cannot solely be
left to handle “mission critical” regulatory mandates.205 Despite more

196. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 822 (emphasis added).
197. In Gantler v. Stephens, the Delaware Supreme Court, in a case of first impression, explicitly
held that corporate officers owe the same fiduciary duties as directors. 965 A.2d 695, 708–09 (Del.
2009).
198. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 824 (Del. 2019) (emphasis added). In Marchand, management had
been getting reports about a growing listeria presence in company plants; however, board minutes
show “no report or discussion of the increasingly frequent positive tests that had been occurring.”
Id. at 812. Other documents showed that for over two years, the board remained unaware of the
growing problem, except for a positive report from the company’s third-party auditor for sanitation.
Id. at 813. The first board-level discussion occurred two days after a limited recall. Id. at 812–14.
199. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019).
200. Id. at *12–13 (citing Marchand extensively).
201. Id. at *12. The court stressed that they were not expecting “omniscience” by the board but
simply evidence of good faith efforts. Id. at *13.
202. Id. at *12–13.
203. See id. at *12 (“[T]he legal academy has observed that Delaware courts are more inclined
to find Caremark oversight liability at the board level when the company operates in the midst of
obligations imposed upon it by positive law yet fails to implement compliance systems,or fails to
monitor existing compliance systems . . . .” (citing In re Facebook, Inc. Sec. 220 Litig., 2019 WL
2320842, at *14 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2019))).
204. Id. at *13 (citing Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821, 824).
205. Id. at *12–13 (citing Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823–24 (Del. 2019)). The court effectively
accounted that the board itself must play a role in “implementing and then overseeing a more
structured compliance system.” Id. at *12 (citing Marchand, 212 A.3d at 823–24).
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Caremark claims surviving motions to dismiss, the Delaware Court of
Chancery remains steadfast to the strict underlying pleading requirements of
Chancery rule 23.1206 that Caremark claims require.207
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
A. The Court’s Holding
Writing for the court, Vice Chancellor Laster held that Hughes
successfully presented a set of particularized facts supporting his allegation
that the defendants breached their fiduciary duty by failing to maintain a
board-level system for monitoring the company’s financial reporting.208
Therefore, the court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss under Court
of Chancery rules 23.1 and 12(b)(6).209
B. “Demand Futility” Analysis
The court first discussed the proper analytical standard for this case. 210
Because Hughes sought to bypass the board and directly move forward with
the litigation on the company’s behalf, the court noted that he first needed to
seek excusal from making a demand.211 The court noted that the Delaware
Supreme Court created two tests to determine if a complaint had sufficiently
pled demand futility: the Aronson212 and Rales213 tests.214 The court found

206. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
207. Compare Marchand, 212 A.3d at 817, 824 (Del. 2019) (surviving motion to dismiss) and
Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 40 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) (surviving motions
to dismiss), with In re MetLife Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0452-SG, 2020 WL 4746635, at *12–14 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 17, 2020) (stating that the pleadings were phrased too broadly), and In re GoPro, Inc.
S’holder Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2018-0784-JRS, 2020 WL 2036602, at *9 (Del. Ch. Apr. 28,
2020) (stating that the “[p]laintiffs’’[c]omplaint is a model of . . . imprecision”).
208. Hughes, slip op. at 36–38.
209. Id. at 40.
210. Id. at 22–29 (discussing at length whether to use the Aronson or Rales test).
211. Id. at 21. Normally, plaintiffs seeking to prosecute derivative suits are limited to situations
where “(i) the stockholder has demanded that the directors pursue the corporate claim and they have
wrongfully refused to do so or (ii) demand is excused because the directors are incapable of making
an impartial decision regarding the litigation.” Id. (citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 932
(Del. 1993)). Therefore, to avoid first making a litigation demand, plaintiffs must allege “with
particularity” their reasoning for not seeking a litigation demand. Id. The court in Hughes,
determined that the facts of the case implicated the second situation. Id. at 22.
212. Id. at 22–24. See supra Section II.B.1 for more a detailed discussion of the Aronson test.
213. Id. at 25. See supra Section II.B.2 for more a detailed discussion of the Rales test.
214. Hughes, slip op. at 22 (citing Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008)). A critical
distinction between the tests is the board’s composition at both the time of the challenged decision
and the consideration of the demand. Id. at 22–24. The Aronson test considers a situation where
the board is the same at both time points, while the Rales test—due to its more comprehensive
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that the complaint against the defendants was not “framed” as an Aronsonstyle lawsuit—challenging either a specific transaction or particular
decision—but rather a more general challenge to the company’s persistent
problems.215 As such, the court applied the more generalized Rales
standard.216
C. The Caremark Claim
The court began by addressing the first claim,217 which alleged that the
defendants “breached their fiduciary duties by willfully failing to maintain
an adequate system of oversight, disclosure controls and procedures, and
internal controls over financial reporting.”218 The court found that the
plaintiff adequately demonstrated that the board of directors—acting through
the audit committee—showed “bad faith conduct” by failing to implement
and monitor meaningful systems and controls for corporate oversight.219 The
court also dismissed the defendants’ argument that since the company did not
suffer harm, the defendants should not be subject to liability.220 As such, the
directors faced a substantial threat of liability under both Caremark claim
paths, and the motion to dismiss as to Count I under rule 23.1 was denied.221

nature—considers only the board’s ability to consider the demand when the complaint was filed.
Id.
215. Id. at 28–29. Moreover, the court held that the central theory of the complaint was a duty
of oversight claim. Id. at 28. The court regarded this duty—otherwise referred to as a Caremark
claim—as outflowing from a company’s directors’ failure to act in protection of the corporation.
Id. at 28–29.
216. Id. at 29.
217. There was a second asserted claim for unjust enrichment. Id. at 38. However, the court
quickly determined that because the analysis of the second claim (“Count II”) “treads the same path
as the demand futility analysis for Count I,” it implicates the same conduct and, as such, the demand
is futile. Id. at 39. Therefore, this claim will not be discussed further.
218. Id. at 29.
219. Id. at 2, 34, 36–38. “For both potential sources, ‘a showing of bad faith conduct . . . is
essential to establish director oversight liability.’” Id. at 30 (alteration in original) (quoting Stone
v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)).
220. Id. at 37. Defendants argued that there was no effect on net income and, as such, there was
no “harm.” Id. The court noted that “Delaware law dictates that the scope of recovery for a breach
of the duty of loyalty is not to be determined narrowly,” and that the cost of restatements, harm to
reputation, and defense of several lawsuits amounts to “harm.” Id. at 37 (quoting Thorpe ex rel.
Castleman v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 445 (Del. 1996)).
221. Id. at 31, 34, 37–38. “Directors face a substantial threat of liability under Caremark if ‘(a)
the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b)
having implemented such a system or controls, consciously failed to monitor or oversee its
operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their
attention.’” Id. at 30 (quoting Stone, 911 A.2d at 370). The court also noted that the pleading under
rule 23.1 was more stringent than under rule 12(b)(6) and, as such, held that a “complaint that
survives a motion to dismiss pursuant to [r]ule 23.1 will also survive a [rule] 12(b)(6) motion to
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IV. ANALYSIS
In Hughes v. Hu,222 the Delaware Chancery Court correctly held that the
Kandi board of directors faced a substantial threat of liability under the duty
of oversight and therefore denied the directors’ motion to dismiss. 223 Section
IV.A discusses why the court correctly decided Hughes.224 Section IV.B
considers why the Hughes holding will likely exacerbate the current trend of
foreign-based corporations disfavoring Delaware as their corporate
governance law source.225 Finally, Section IV.C explains why Delaware
courts should consider a corporation’s principal business market when
determining potential Caremark liability and therefore make “territorial
adjustments” in determining the acceptable level of oversight.226
A. The Delaware Chancery Court’s Holding is Consistent with
Precedent
The Hughes court correctly applied the Rales test when it determined
demand futility for two reasons: (1) the nature of the complaint itself and (2)
the Hughes court’s position was consistent with recent precedent regarding
the situational applicability of the demand futility tests.227 The Delaware
Chancery Court also correctly rejected Kandi’s claims that its oversight
efforts were sufficient to meet its Caremark burden by reasonably inferring
from the plaintiff’s particularized facts—and grounded in prior precedent—
that the board failed to provide meaningful oversight. 228
1. The Court’s Use of the Rales Test in Determining Demand Futility
is Consistent with the Nature of the Complaint and Precedent
The Delaware Chancery Court spent a considerable amount of time
determining the applicable demand futility test to apply to the facts at hand.229
Ultimately, the court determined the correct test by focusing on the alleged

dismiss, assuming that it otherwise contains sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim.” Id. at 39–
40 (quoting In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009)).
222. C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
223. Id. at 37–38.
224. See infra Section IV.A.
225. See infra Section IV.B.
226. See infra Section IV.C.
227. See infra Section IV.A.1.
228. See infra Section IV.A.2.
229. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 22–29 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
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challenged actions230 rather than the board’s composition.231 The court noted
that the complaint was not alleging an “Aronson-style” suit—where the
plaintiff was challenging a specific transaction or a particular decision—but
rather was alleging that the harm caused by the directors’ lack of financial
oversight was a chronic issue.232 This framing of chronic versus acute harm
closely matches a core philosophical underpinning of Caremark liability—
that “oversight” implies actions over time and not a specific action in time.233
The court’s holistic analysis in selecting the Rales test over the Aronson test
further solidifies the court’s reluctance to be dogmatically bound by factual
technicalities in determining the applicable demand futility test.234
2. The Court’s Caremark Liability Holding is Consistent with Recent
Precedent
Caremark’s core principle is that directors are liable if they failed to
create or maintain board-level information-gathering systems.235 While the
bar of effort needed to satisfy this basic principle is not excruciatingly high,236
230. Id. at 28–29.
231. Id. The court openly admitted that the board composition alone should lead to an Aronson
analysis. Id. at 28 (“Technically, because less than ‘a majority of the directors making the decision
have been replaced’ . . . Aronson would govern.” (alteration in original) (internal citation omitted)).
Id.
232. Id. at 28–29.
233. See Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 822–24 (Del. 2019) (noting that the boards
continual “lack of efforts” to ensure some form of oversight lead to a liability under Caremark); see
also Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140 (Del. 2008) (“The . . . (Rales) test applies where the subject
of a derivative suit is not a business decision of the Board but rather a violation of the Board’s
oversight duties.”) (emphasis added).
234. Hughes, slip op. at 29 n.3 (citing eleven cases since 2017 where Delaware courts have held
that the Rales test was applied for demand futility to director oversight claims). Some commentators
have noted this preference towards the conceptually broader Rales test. DONALD J. WOLFE, JR. &
MICHAEL A. PITTENGER, CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICE IN THE DELAWARE COURT OF
CHANCERY § 11.03(c)(4)(ii) (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 2nd ed. 2020) (“[O]ne might argue that
the current state of this area of the law is conceptually inverted . . . . Indeed, recent decisional law
seems to be trending incrementally toward a recognition of and preference for the more efficient
utility of the Rales analysis.”).
235. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“[C]orporate
boards may satisfy their obligation to be reasonably informed concerning the corporation, without
assuring themselves that information and reporting systems exist . . . that are reasonably designed
to provide to senior management and to the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to
allow . . . the board . . . to reach informed judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance
with law and its business performance.”); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006) (observing
that directors face liability under Caremark if: “(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any
reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls,
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being
informed of risks or problems requiring their attention.”).
236. See In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 395872, at *15 (Del.
Ch. June 26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016) (holding that that by having “some oversight,”
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the bottom-line effort is a showing of “good faith” by the directors.237
Therefore companies facing Caremark liability routinely and successfully
argue that their “good faith” attempts in taking “some” efforts to address their
“risks”238 shields them from Caremark liability.239 Yet, Delaware courts
have found that minimal efforts by boards to implement meaningful controls
are not a panacea to avoid liability.240
Shareholders face an uphill statutory climb 241 in convincing the courts
to reject the companies pleading of “good faith.”242 They must show, using
“particularized facts,” that the board-level controls were virtually
meaningless.243 But the court’s holding that the board faced a “substantial
likelihood of liability under Caremark” extends a recent trend of cases where
the Chancery Court has rejected pleadings of “good faith” by more readily
accepting reasonable inferences drawn from the plaintiff’s well-plead
“particularized facts.”244
albeit not detailed enough to bring to the board’s attention the specific issue, can defeat arguments
that the board “should have . . . had a better reporting system.”).
237. Marchand, 212 A.3d at 821.
238. While the term “risks” is relatively all-encompassing unto itself, Delaware courts have
narrowed the scope of applicable “risks” that boards must “make themselves aware of” to mean
mostly “legal risks.” See supra Section II.C.3. “Business risks” are generally covered by the
business judgment rule. Id.
239. In re Gen. Motors Co., 2015 WL 395872, at *15.
240. See, e.g., Rich ex rel. Fuqi Int’l, Inc. v. Yu Kwai Chong, 66 A.3d 963, 983 (Del. Ch. 2013)
(concluding that despite the existence of an audit committee and independent auditor, the company
“had no meaningful controls in place”).
241. The Delaware Chancery Court is bound by the heightened pleading requirements of rule
23.1 where “conclusionary [sic] allegations of fact or law not supported by the allegations of specific
fact may not be taken as true.” Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988) rev’d on other
grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a).
242. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 27 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
243. Id. at 21 (“But once a plaintiff pleads particularized allegations, then the plaintiff is entitled
to all ‘reasonable inferences [that] logically flow from particularized facts alleged by the plaintiff.’”
(alteration in original) (quoting Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart,
845 A.2d 1040, 1048 (Del. 2004))).
244. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188,
at *1, *10, *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019); Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 824 (Del. 2019). These
cases have prompted significant debate within the legal community about the difficulty of pleading
a Caremark case. E.g., Stephanie C. Evans & Alan J. Wilson, Another Reminder from Delaware
About
the
Duty
of
Oversight,
WILMERHALE
(Oct.
28,
2019),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/blogs/focus-on-audit-committees-accounting-and-thelaw/20191028-another-reminder-from-delaware-about-the-duty-of-oversight. Some practitioners
do not read these cases as lowering Caremark’s pleading difficulty since the cases must still
withstand later litigation phases. Id. Rather, these cases show a greater acceptance by the Delaware
Chancery Court in making reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs’ favor during the initial litigation
phases. Id. It is worth noting that the defendants in Marchand and In re Clovis—the two Caremark
cases to survive motions to dismiss immediately before Hughes—were monoline businesses. Id.
Kandi, on the other hand, operates in the wider electric vehicle market and produces a range of
products. KNDI: NASDAQ GS Stock Quote, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2021, 10:12 AM),
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B. The Court’s Holding Will Exacerbate Foreign Companies’
Avoidance of Delaware Corporation Law
Delaware has long been heralded as the “de facto national corporate
law[maker]” and the gold standard for corporate governance law.245 This
praise is not unjustly warranted, as Delaware has a triumvirate of businessfriendly entities: courts with judges experienced in corporation law, a
legislature attentive to business needs, and interested local groups.246
However, recent avoidance by foreign-based firms has led some scholars to
question Delaware’s global prominence as the premier purveyor of corporate
governance law.247 For over twenty years, foreign corporations listed on
American stock exchanges have dramatically shifted from incorporating in
Delaware to incorporating in foreign nations.248 This shift is paradoxical
given both the rise of foreign corporations accessing American capital
markets249 and the presumption that company managers select incorporation
locations that investors view positively.250 While this drift is plausibly

https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/KNDI:US. Logically, monoline businesses are the simplest
form of producers and therefore, risks in monoline businesses should be more apparent than other
companies that delve into a larger number of products. The oversight standards announced in
Marchand—and reinforced in In re Clovis—thus should be more stringent than multi-product or
multi-field companies. However, this potential distinction in potential oversight standards for
monoline and multi-line businesses is yet to be analyzed.
245. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law,
58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1574 (2005) (noting that Delaware “has long been viewed as the de facto
national corporate law”); Goshen, supra note 18, at 426 (“Delaware . . . is widely recognized as the
most significant jurisdiction for corporate-law purposes . . . .”).
246. William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1435, 1437–38
(2020).
247. William J. Moon, Delaware’s Global Competitiveness, 106 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
2021) (manuscript at 27–35) (on file with author) (providing a detailed review of several potential
explanations for Delaware’s weakness in competing for foreign-based firms).
248. Moon, supra note 247, at 20 tbl.1 (showing that between 1985 and 2016 the ratio of
Delaware to foreign-nation incorporation of American-listed foreign corporations shifted from
roughly 2:1 to 1:5).
249. Stephen Grocer, Chinese Companies Flocked to U.S. Markets in 2018. The Trade War May
Have
Had
a
Role,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
2,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/02/business/dealbook/trade-war-china-ipos.html;
Evelyn
Cheng, Chinese Companies Are Leading the Global IPO Rush Amid a ‘Flight from Uncertainty’,
CNBC (Oct. 27, 2020, 12:18 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/27/chinese-companies-areleading-the-global-ipo-rush-amid-a-flight-from-uncertainty.html.
250. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1420 (1989) (“The managers who pick the state of incorporation that is most desirable from
the perspective of investors will attract the most money.”); Brian Broughman et al., Delaware Law
as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. & ECON. 865, 866 (2014) (stating that “a firm
wishing to attract investors from around the country may choose Delaware merely to provide a law
that can be ‘spoken’ by all of its investors”).
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attributed to tax reduction objectives,251 this idea misses an essential factor
foreign-based firms consider: local business environments.252
Many foreign corporations only interact with the United States to access
the world’s largest capital markets and potentially opt into some available
corporate governance rules.253 Therefore, many of these foreign corporations
conduct the vast majority of their business within their local, foreign
markets.254 These local markets can differ significantly from the general
American market.255 The differences in markets can lead to operational
incompatibility between Delaware’s corporate governance laws and local
practices.256 The Hughes holding both demonstrates the potential legal issues
that can arise from operational incompatibility and provides a potential
warning to managers of foreign companies that Delaware courts do not
understand—or more accurately, do not account for—their particular
business environments in litigation matters.257
The primary operational incompatibility apparent in Hughes was the
corporate structure and governance style of Kandi.258 Similar to several other
U.S.-listed Chinese companies, Kandi is roughly structured as a corporate
group.259 These corporate groups routinely conduct intra-group transactions
251. See Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 276 (2010) (“In some
circumstances, managers will opt to minimize taxes by choosing a tax haven or tax-friendly
jurisdiction, even if that jurisdiction is suboptimal from the standpoint of corporate law.”); Moon,
supra note 246, at 1407 n.17, 1454 (providing an example of the tax implications of moving the
location of incorporation from an American state to a tax haven).
252. See infra notes 253–256 and accompanying text.
253. Kandi Technologies Group is a perfect example. The company is publicly traded on the
NASDAQ, incorporated in Delaware, but the majority of its business is in China. Hughes v. Hu,
C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020); Company Profile, KANDI GROUP,
http://ir.kandigroup.com/profile (last visited Feb. 8, 2021). As of 2016, the two primary states of
incorporation for Chinese corporations listed in American stock markets were Delaware and
Nevada. Moon, supra note 247, at 22 tbl.2.
254. See, e.g., Chinese Companies Listed on Major U.S. Stock Exchanges, U.S.-CHINA
ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION 1, 3, 8, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/
files/2020-10/Chinese_Companies_on_US_Stock_Exchanges_10-2020.pdf (Oct. 2, 2020) (listing
several prominent Chinese companies, including Kandi, that are listed on U.S. exchanges but
primarily do business in China).
255. Moon, supra note 247, at 50 (“That is, local market environments—shaped by an array of
factors including government policies, regulatory laws, capital markets, business culture, and
judicial infrastructure—affect the corporate law preferences of firms.”).
256. Moon, supra note 247, at 51–52.
257. See infra notes 258–278 and accompanying text.
258. See infra notes 259–273 and accompanying text.
259. The term “corporate group” is a nebulous term, but a key characteristic of corporate groups
is common ownership. Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate Identity
Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 886 (2012). Corporate groups in China—as well as
other regions of the world such as Latin America, and Continental Europe—are a well-known
phenomenon. Moon, supra note 247, at 39–40; Raymond Fisman & Yongxiang Wang, Trading
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as a general means of economic efficiency.260 Therefore, Xiaoming Hu’s
ownership of sizable portions261 of both the company and the contracting
service company is not—situationally—abnormal.262 Vertical control is a
relative rarity in the United States263 and “self-deals” commonly form the
basis for shareholder derivative litigation.264 Therefore, the Hughes
approach, in which the court did not consider how the challenged company
typically conducts business, is problematic for foreign-based companies.265
This approach potentially exposes foreign-based companies to massive
future litigation costs.266 Put succinctly, “Delaware’s elaborate legal regime
policing ‘self-dealing’ transactions clashes with China’s contemporary
market dynamics, where firms operating as corporate groups routinely

Favors Within Chinese Business Groups, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 429, 430 (2010) (“Most large
Chinese firms belong[] to a business group . . . .”); Li-Wen Lin & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the
(National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 697, 706 (2013) (“[B]usiness groups fostered by the political regime and deeply entwined with
Chinese Communist Party leadership may be central to the developmental success of the regime.”).
260. The term “economic efficiency” should be construed in the broadest possible terms.
Transactions within groups decrease the transaction capital costs and overcome external structural
weaknesses such as weak contract enforcement by judicial entities and weak capital markets. See
Jens Dammann, Related Party Transactions and Intragroup Transactions, in THE LAW AND
FINANCE OF RELATED P ARTY TRANSACTIONS 218, 218 (Luca Enriques & Tobias Tröger eds.,
2019); see generally Lisa A. Keister, Interfirm Relations in China: Group Structure and Firm
Performance in Business Groups, 52 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1709 (2009) (describing the economic
effects of using a corporate group structure in China).
261. Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020) (“Xiaoming
Hu is the Company’s CEO and chairman of its board of directors. He beneficially owns 28.4% of
the Company. He also owns 13% of the Service Company.”).
262. Ho, supra note 259, at 886.
263. See Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 731–36 (2017)
(detailing some of the historical concerns regarding vertical integration).
264. Moon, supra note 247, at 55 (“[T]he United States is fairly unique in the world, in terms of
the relative lack of self-dealing transactions and corporate groups.”).
265. Related Party Transactions Minority Shareholder and Rights, OECD 9 (2012),
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/50089215.pdf (“Around the world, company groups and concentrated
ownership are normal, the exceptions being in the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia.
Under such conditions, RPTs are mainly with the controlling shareholders and/or with members of
a company group.”). This analysis should not be read as an approval of self-dealing. As Professor
Moon put it, “[t]he normative merits of self-dealing transactions are at best murky. After all,
controlling shareholders can wield their power to expropriate minority shareholders by engaging in
transactions that enrich themselves . . . . But the normative desirability of self-dealing
transactions . . . depends on the web of regulatory laws and market conditions.” Moon, supra note
247, at 44.
266. Shareholder litigation is a costly and timely endeavor. Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating
Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 85–86 (2011). This is not to
say that shareholder derivative litigation is not a useful and protection mechanism to prevent abuses
of managerial misconduct. Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in
Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1345–46 (1993).

1276

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 80:1247

engage in ‘self-dealing’ transactions as part of normal business.” 267 This
difference in typical business styles is a strong headwind in pushing foreignbased companies to jurisdictions that allow for such interconnected business
structures.268
Moreover, in the United States, when directors have stakes on both ends
of a business dealing, only the independent directors can cleanse the
company’s deal.269 The demand for “independent directors” presents an issue
for many Chinese companies, as management is routinely helmed by firm
founders and socially connected directors.270 Although the Hughes court
does not cite Marchand’s analysis of the impact that social connections have
on director independence,271 it does analogize to Marchand in its oversight
analysis.272 Therefore, the Hughes court’s reliance on Marchand as an
analogous case does little to assuage potential concerns that foreigncorporation managers might have about how Delaware judges would view
the directors’ decisions.273
Hughes represents a potential turning point for Delaware’s place as an
international supplier of corporate governance law.274 Foreign corporations

267. Moon, supra note 247, at 36. “[T]he United States is fairly unique in the world, in terms of
the relative lack of self-dealing transactions and corporate groups.” Id. at 55.
268. Some jurisdictions like the British Virgin Islands require the court’s permission before
bringing a derivative suit and courts consider “the interests of the company taking account of the
views of the company’s directors on commercial matters” and “the costs of the proceedings in
relation to the relief likely to be obtained.” BVI Business Companies Act, 2004, §§ 184C (V.I.).
Pleading thresholds in other jurisdictions are so high and recoveries so limited as to make derivative
suits unappealing. Breach of Duty by Director of a Cayman Fund – The Path to Investor Relief in
the Cayman Islands vs New York, MOURANT 4 (July 2017), https://www.mourant.com/filelibrary/media—-2016/2016-guides/breach-of-duty-by-director-of-a-cayman-fund.pdf.
269. When select directors are considered “interested” in a potential dealing—because of a
personal, financial, or any other reason—only “disinterested” directors can approve, or “cleanse,”
the company’s involvement in that deal. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(1) (2020); Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested
Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 903, 905 (2011). Another way to “cleanse” these types of deals
is via a shareholder’s vote of approval. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(2) (2020).
270. Moon, supra note 247, at 45–46; Sang Yop Kang, The Independent Director System in
China: Weaknesses, Dilemmas, and Potential Silver Linings, 9 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 151, 153–
54 (2017).
271. Compare Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820 (Del. 2019) (“[T]he fact that fellow
directors are social acquaintances . . . does not, in itself, raise a fair inference of nonindependence . . . . [A]ny realistic consideration of the question of independence must give weight
to these important relationships and their natural effect on the ability of the parties to act
impartially . . . .”), with Hughes v. Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 30–38 (Del. Ch. Apr.
27, 2020) (making no mention of Marchand’s social connections analysis).
272. Hughes, slip op. at 35–36.
273. See Moon, supra note 247, at 46 (“Given this reality, it is unlikely that Delaware courts will
find appointed ‘independent’ directors in China to be truly independent.”).
274. See infra notes 275–278 and accompanying text.
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that look to Hughes see the possibility of costly, continuous, and seemingly
unwarranted shareholder litigation based solely on a perceived animosity
towards their typical business practices.275 Therefore, Delaware will appear
uninviting and, consequently, open the door for new nations to compete for
these corporations’ business.276 This new competition—coupled with
institutional investors’ seeming acceptance of corporations incorporating in
“lax” jurisdictions—further promotes a Delaware exodus.277 Therefore,
desires to maintain typical local business market practices will lead to
foreign-corporations incorporating in more compatible jurisdictions. 278
C. Delaware Courts, in Caremark Liability Analyses, Should Allow for
“Territorial Adjustments”
Corporation law is big business in Delaware.279 Moreover, the state
government is aware of the outsized role of corporate franchise taxes on the
state.280 However, as more countries begin to offer competitive corporate law
regimes281 that protect directors and companies from costly shareholder

275. See supra notes 259–273 and accompanying text; see Moon, supra note 247, at 8–9 (“[I]f
a corporation operates predominantly in China—where self-dealing transactions are routine,
tolerated by local authorities, and constitute an important strategy to compete in certain sectors—
that corporation would be averse to Delaware law . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Erickson, supra note
266, at 85–86.
276. Moon, supra note 246, at 1409 (“[A] handful of foreign nation states are actively vying to
gain a share of the American corporate law market.”).
277. Scott Hirst, The Case for Investor Ordering, 8 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 227, 231 (2018) (“[T]he
rise of institutional investors has transformed the ownership of U.S. corporations. Institutional
investors, such as investment managers and pension funds, now invest the overwhelming majority
of capital in U.S. corporations and have the capability to determine corporations’ choice of
arrangements.”) (footnote omitted); Moon, supra note 247, at 47, 49 (“Institutional investors in the
United States thus far have not (successfully) demanded that Chinese firms incorporate in
Delaware.”).
278. Moon, supra note 247, at 49 (noting that the lack of institutional investor pressure on
foreign-based firms to include “enhanced contractual safeguards” indicates that incorporation in
non-Delaware jurisdictions—primarily Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands—is based
more on “corporate governance rules that comport with local market conditions rather than
facilitating fraud”).
279. Moon, supra note 246, at 1429–30 (“Delaware’s incorporation fee revenues, which are
often heralded as the textbook case of legislative dependence on corporate charter fees, averaged
17% of the state’s total tax revenue over the past several decades.”).
280. Governor’s Budget Financial Summary and Charts, DEL. OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET,
https://budget.delaware.gov/budget/fy2020/documents/operating/financial-summary.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 15, 2020) (estimating revenues from incorporation revenues to be 27.6% of all revenues
for the fiscal year 2020).
281. While roughly three additional countries—Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, and the
Cayman Islands—might not seem like a significant jump in the number of competitors, it is worth
noting that Delaware is not earnestly competing with other American states. Marcel Kahan & Ehud
Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2002) (“[T]he
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derivative litigation,282 Delaware corporation law risks diminishing in
value.283 Delaware’s government seems aware of this potential calamity, as
it routinely touts the benefits of its corporation laws for international
businesses.284 Therefore, if Delaware wishes to remain a leading supplier of
corporate law to foreign firms listed in U.S. stock markets, something must
change.285
The Hughes holding’s warning signals indicate the best places for
immediate adjustments: the treatment of the typical business operations in
legally-weak jurisdictions and the unworkability of genuinely independent
directors in several countries to cleanse self-dealings.286 The courts possess
greater institutional competency to handle independent adjustments based on
a business’s primary operating market given the analysis’s fact-intensive
nature.287 In contrast, the legislature is the better institution to address selfdealings since these standards are primarily enumerated.288
Any potential amendments to self-dealing statutes are fraught with
possible widespread policy concerns regarding shareholder protections.289
Delaware’s self-dealing statute offers several means to cleanse self-deals;290
however, local business practices make these options relatively unworkable
to many foreign-based companies.291 While self-dealing can provide some
potentially useful benefits,292 loosening the restrictions would likely harm
minority shareholders.293 Moreover, America is unique in that corporate law
very notion that states compete for incorporation[] is a myth. Other than Delaware, no state is
engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations of public companies.”).
282. Erickson, supra note 266, at 86.
283. As companies avoid or—more alarmingly to the Delaware legislature—leave Delaware as
their place of incorporation, the state both loses revenue and Delaware corporation law loses its
allure as the “gold standard” of corporation law. See supra notes 245, 280 and accompanying text.
284. Beyond the Borders: Delaware’s Benefits for International Business, DELAWARE,
https://corplaw.delaware.gov/delawares-benefits-international-business/ (last visited Feb. 13,
2020).
285. See infra notes 296–344 and accompanying text.
286. See supra Section IV.B.
287. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1078 (2000) (“Delaware chancery judges are known
for their expertise in business matters, and the court has developed a reputation for its sophistication
in corporate law.”).
288. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2020).
289. See infra notes 290–295 and accompanying text.
290. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 144(a)(1)–(3) (2020).
291. See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
292. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
293. Moon, supra note 247, at 44 (“[C]ontrolling shareholders can wield their power to
expropriate minority shareholders by engaging in transactions that enrich themselves . . . . In its
most perverse form, self-dealing is the legalized looting of minority shareholders.”). Moreover, the
controlling normative theory of business ethics in America is the shareholder (or stockholder)
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is not handled by the federal government.294 Therefore, given America’s
general animosity towards self-dealing, a loosening of these standards might
prompt a federal reaction.295 Consequently, since these related-party
transactions might never be adequately cleansed, the number of Caremark
suits foreign corporations could face will only continue to grow as a result.
Therefore, in Caremark liability analyses, I propose that Delaware
courts allow for “territorial adjustments“ in determining the acceptable level
of oversight for companies that primarily do business in non-American
markets.296 This proposition leverages both the Delaware Court of
Chancery’s and the Delaware Supreme Court’s business expertise,297 and the
fact-intensive nature of Caremark analyses298 to achieve a potentially
equitable and business-friendly approach.299 The core of this proposition is
not a rewriting or lowering of Caremark’s “bottom-line requirement,”300 but
rather a reconsidering of Caremark’s “good faith” effort standards by
considering the sophistication of the business’s underlying primary
market.301 Caremark liability is a fact-intensive judicially created concept;
therefore, the addition of a territorial factor—which would also be a factintensive inquiry—is well within the court’s institutional capabilities.302

theory, which holds that a firm’s primary responsibility is to its shareholders. H. Jeff Smith, The
Shareholders vs. Stakeholders Debate, MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. (July 15, 2003),
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-shareholders-vs-stakeholders-debate/. Therefore, judges
would not likely view even cleansed deals favorably should they do significant damage to minority
shareholders. Id.; Moon, supra note 247, at 44.
294. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 26
REGULATION 26, 26 (2003) (“For over 200 years, corporate governance has been a matter for state
law.”).
295. Under the “‘‘stockholder’ theory,” actions that harm stockholders are viewed as suspect.
Smith, supra note 293. Therefore, if self-dealing was allowed to be more pervasive under America’s
leading provider of corporate governance law, then the potential harms would justify the federal
government preempting such a potentially harmful piece of legislation. Chris Brummer, Corporate
Law Preemption in an Age of Global Capital Markets, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1089 (2008)
(“Delaware provides law in the shadow of the threat of federal intervention, and from this vantage
point preemption serves as the primary discipline and motivation for efficient laws. Yet even here,
the federal government cannot and does not monitor all of Delaware’s lawmaking.”) (footnote
omitted); Bainbridge, supra note 294, at 26.
296. See infra notes 297–344 and accompanying text.
297. Fisch, supra note 287, at 1078.
298. In re Puda Coal, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6476-CS, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 338, at
*14–15 (Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013) (showing that analysis of liability under Caremark is a rigorous
inquiry that will depend on the facts of the case).
299. See infra notes 318–320 and accompanying text.
300. Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 821 (Del. 2019).
301. See infra notes 313–320, and accompanying text.
302. In re Puda Coal, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 338, at *14–15; Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362,
364–65, 370 (Del. 2006) (accepting and defining the prongs of Caremark liability).
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The Hughes decision is correct303—mainly due to the company’s
excessive laissez-faire concern for oversight.304 The court rendered its
decision at the motion to dismiss stage,305 a stage that most Caremark cases
rarely survive.306 Caremark cases that survive a motion to dismiss typically
present facts showing that a board—in fact or in practice—failed to either
implement any board-level oversight or ignored some legal risk.307 Both
failings were present in Hughes.308 Therefore, this suggestion is not a plea to
overturn the Hughes holding.309 Instead, this proposal addresses potential
misgivings that future foreign-company directors—who try in good faith to
attempt proper oversight—might have when considering incorporation in
Delaware because of the Hughes holding.310 A duology of cases presents the
intellectual framework underpinning this proposal.311
In In re General Motors Co. Derivative Litigation,312 the Delaware
Chancery Court acknowledged that while boards may miss critical oversight
risks within their companies, affirmative actions by the board to try and
become aware of these risks represent “some oversight.”313 Moreover, the
General Motors court noted that the plaintiff’s arguments that the board
“should have . . . had a better reporting system” carried little weight.314
Likewise, in In re Puda Coal, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, the Delaware
Chancery Court expressed that “[c]ompanies . . . should all try to be as law

303. See supra Section IV.A for a longer discussion of the Hughes decision in relation to
standing precedent.
304. The court spent considerable time referencing the disconnect between the limited time the
audit committee met and the critical work the board tasked the committee with doing. Hughes v.
Hu, C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. at 9–16 (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020). The court also stressed the
seeming disregard the company had towards quickly addressing the critical accounting failures. Id.
at 5, 14, 17.
305. Id. at 2.
306. Pollman, supra note 191, at 2036. See supra notes 254–260 and accompanying text.
307. Pollman, supra note 191, at 2036–37.
308. Hughes, slip op. at 5, 9–17. Had the audit committee spent more time—both in terms of
literal total time and time of actual critical review—considering the financial reports or were more
critical of management’s ability to provide meaningful and accurate information to the committee,
this case might not have survived the motion to dismiss. Id. at 35–36 (distinguishing the case at
hand from General Motors, where the board had demonstrated “some oversight” and therefore were
not violating Caremark).
309. See infra notes 313–320 and accompanying text.
310. See infra notes 313–320 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 290–298 and accompanying text.
312. In re Gen. Motors Co. Derivative Litig., No. 9627-VCG, 2015 WL 395872 (Del. Ch. June
26, 2015), aff’d, 133 A.3d 971 (Del. 2016).
313. Id. at *15 (noting that the creation of the “Finance and Risk Committee” and “Audit
Committee” equated to positive actions undertaken by the board to become aware of potential risks).
314. Id. at *15 (“Plaintiffs concede that the Board was exercising some oversight, albeit not to
the Plaintiffs’ hindsight-driven satisfaction.”).
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compliant as [they] can.”315 The court noted that company oversight is—
realistically—never perfect, and therefore the “reasonableness of peoples’
efforts at compliance” is proportional to the risks and the business.316 The
Puda Coal court also provided an apt example of what directors for
principally foreign-based companies—in this case, China—should do to
meet Caremark’s “good faith” standard.317 In particular, the court noted that
directors should be physically located in and have the language skills to
operate in the “environment in which the company is operating.” 318 If courts
require directors to have the skills to operate successfully within their
business’s specific operating environment, then, logically, the courts must be
able to identify what a successful business operation looks like in nonAmerican markets.319 General Motors and Puda Coal together create a
notion that, with regard to Caremark liability, directors operating in their
unique markets must reasonably try to be “successful” and should not be held
to overly punitive or U.S.-centric evaluations in hindsight.320
However, many practitioners might have concerns with judges
“territorially adjusting” a company’s acceptable level of oversight.321 One
potential concern of having judges consider the underlying primary business
market while determining Caremark liability is that it would create two
separate standards for businesses—based solely on the primary place of
business. Essentially, one standard would be considered the “traditional,”
(and presumably stricter) standard for “American” companies,322 and the
other being a “territorially-adjusted,” (and presumably more lenient) standard
for “foreign” companies.323 On its face, this bifurcated standard would

315. In re Puda Coal, Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 6476-CS, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 338, at *15
(Del. Ch. Feb. 6, 2013).
316. Id. at *15 (“[Y]ou can be at a company where it has a $25 billion market cap and it’s
assessed a $45 million regulatory penalty . . . . That proportionality comes into play in assessing
Caremark and the reasonableness of peoples’ efforts at compliance because you can’t watch
everybody everywhere.”).
317. Id. at *14 (noting that “you better have your physical body in China an awful lot . . .
have . . . a system of controls to make sure that you know that you actually own the assets . . . have
the language skills to navigate the environment in which the company is operating . . . [and] retain[]
accountants and lawyers who are fit to the task of maintaining a system of controls over a public
company”).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. See supra notes 313–319 and accompanying text.
321. See infra notes 324, 331–333 and accompanying text.
322. In this context, “American” refers to those companies that do most of their business in the
U.S. or U.S.-like markets and are therefore subject to present (i.e., “traditional”) Caremark liability
standard.
323. In this context “foreign” refers to those companies that do most of their business in nonU.S.-like markets and are therefore subject to a territorially adjusted Caremark liability standard.
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potentially drive companies operating in “traditional” jurisdictions to
“territorially-adjusted” jurisdictions,324 thereby exacerbating the exact
problem Delaware would try to avoid.325 However, this interpretation misses
the mark, as the division between “American” and “foreign” companies is
not meant to be a “bright-line” rule based solely on a company’s location, but
a more comprehensive inquiry into how companies in that region conduct
business in those markets.326
In practice, judicial consideration of a company’s underlying business
market would be comparable to the consideration of the company’s industry
when considering sufficient oversight, which the Delaware Chancery Court
has routinely taken into consideration when considering “bad faith” in
oversight.327 As such, judicial consideration of a company’s underlying
business market would help courts better understand what oversight
measures the challenged company attempted—or, in the case of Hughes, did
not attempt328—and to better determine if the company missed the “red flags”
that were either “waived [sic] in one’s face or displayed so that they are
visible to the careful observer.”329 Therefore, this new consideration—like
the court’s consideration of the company’s industry—is a means of giving

324. The norm for corporate managers is to attempt to maximize shareholder value. Alicia E.
Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to
New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TRANSACTIONS 221, 242 (2012). But see Afra Afsharipour,
Redefining Corporate Purpose: An International Perspective, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 465, 468
(2017) (noting that there are challenges to this norm). Therefore, similar to some tax reduction
practices, managers might determine that reincorporating to the perceived “more lenient”
jurisdiction would achieve greater shareholder value than remaining in the perceived “more
stringent” jurisdiction. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 279–280 and accompanying text.
326. For example, suppose the “market” in the fictional country of Luciland is highly similar to
the American market, and the challenged company primarily does business there. In this case, it
stands to reason that courts should view the company under a more “American-like” conception of
typical “good faith,” considering the typical business practices of that region. On the other hand,
suppose the “market” in the fictional country of Elvisland is more lenient towards “self-dealings”
in corporate groups, and the challenged company primarily does business there. In that case, the
court should consider Elvisland’s business realities when determining Caremark liability while also
not forgetting the minimal requirements established under Delaware case law.
327. In re MetLife Inc., C.A. No. 2019-0452-SG, 2020 WL 4746635, at *14 (Del. Ch. Aug. 17,
2020) (“Regarding the second Caremark prong—at issue here—a plaintiff can establish a board’s
bad faith by showing that it saw red flags related to compliance with law and consciously
disregarded those flags.”). For example, in Marchand, the court was explicit in saying that the “red
flags” were failings in being compliant with food safety requirements, which were “critical to the
company’s business operation.” Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 816, 822 (Del. 2019). Here,
operating within the business realities of the primary place of business would also be mission
critical. See supra notes 317–319, and accompanying text.
328. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
329. In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 2017-0222-JRS, 2019 WL 4850188,
at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2019) (quoting Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 143 (Del. 2008)).
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context to, and not alleviation from, what constitutes “sustained or systemic
failure[s]” of board oversight.330
Another potential criticism is that this “territorial-adjustment”
consideration would not go far enough in assuaging foreign-corporation
directors of potential litigation risks. 331 Although this criticism bears some
weight—for if other jurisdictions can offer greater accommodations,332 then
why select Delaware corporation law at all333—it misses the critical benefit
of incorporating in Delaware, which is access to the full complement of
Delaware’s case law and the courts that make it.334
When foreign corporations incorporate in the United States, they are
typically buying into a suite of laws: state corporate law, federal securities
laws, and various other business regulations.335 The benefit of “buying” this
suite—with Delaware corporate law being the first “product” in the bundle—
versus shopping around for the best “deal”—is Delaware’s extensive case
law.336 Because of its near-universal familiarity,337 this large body of case
law creates both predictability338 and lowered transaction costs for

330. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(emphasis added) (“Generally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate loss is predicated
upon ignorance of liability creating activities within the corporation . . . only a sustained or
systemic failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . will establish the lack of good faith that is a
necessary condition to liability.”) (emphasis added).
331. See infra notes 332–333 and accompanying text.
332. Here, “accommodations” especially refers to those accommodations offered by non-U.S.
jurisdictions to potentially decrease the litigation risks from shareholder derivative suits. See supra
note 268.
333. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
334. See infra notes 335–345 and accompanying text.
335. Omari S. Simmons, Delaware’s Global Threat, 41 J. CORP. L. 217, 224 (2015).
336. Jonathan G. Rohr, Corporate Governance, Collective Action and Contractual Freedom:
Justifying Delaware’s New Restrictions on Private Ordering, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 803, 817 (2017)
(“The case law ‘provides a pool of handy precedents, and the basis for obtaining almost
instantaneously a legal opinion on any issue of Delaware law. These features of stability and
predictability are desired by managers who need quick opinions on proposed activities.’”) (quoting
Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG.
225, 274 (1985)). There are also other benefits to “buying” Delaware corporation law, such as
“signaling” to potential investors. Brian J. Broughman & Darian M. Ibrahim, Delaware’s
Familiarity, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 273, 299–300 (2015). But those benefits won’t be discussed
further in this Note.
337. As aptly described by Professors Broughman and Ibrahim, Delaware corporation law is the
“lingua franca,” or bridge language, of corporation law. Broughman & Ibrahim, supra note 336, at
277–78.
338. Rohr, supra note 336, at 817–18; Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law:
A Theory of Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 212 (2011) (““The
judicial opinions that result from frequent litigation benefit all members of the Delaware network,
because such opinions provide firms with interpretive guidance on matters of Delaware corporate
law.”“).
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corporations.339 Therefore, leaving or avoiding Delaware corporation law
because of fear of litigation might be both an overreaction to a solvable
problem340 and a needless avoidance of a potentially valuable good.341
A “territorial-adjustment” will not eliminate the potential for costly
litigation; however, it will allow the courts to create specific case law that
“rewards”342 foreign-based companies that in “good faith” try to reach
Delaware’s standards and punishes those truly “bad-actors.”343 Moreover,
this suggestion does not require eviscerating Delaware’s established
standards in corporate governance; instead, it merely proposes a discretionary
supplement the court may use depending on the specific case.344 Therefore,
as courts adjudicate more cases using the “territorial-adjustment”
consideration, foreign-based companies operating in “good faith” gain both
protection from this new branch of case law while still having access to the
full breadth of Delaware case law.345
The Delaware Chancery Court has both the expertise and ability to
facilitate the fact-intensive inquiries necessary to consider a business’s
primary marketplace’s sophistication.346 Therefore, the court should
consider “territorially-adjusting” what its Caremark good faith standard is on
a case-by-case basis to account for the variety of corporate governance
styles.347
339. Broughman & Ibrahim, supra note 336, at 300; Kahan & Kamar, supra note 281, at 725–
26 (noting that although a competing state might “copy[]” Delaware’s corporate code and instruct
its judges to “interpret the code in light of Delaware precedent,” that state would still not “deliver
the same product that Delaware does”).
340. See infra notes 342–345 and accompanying text.
341. Moon, supra note 247, at 7 n.23.
342. By “rewards,” I mean both the creation of case law that, in essence, protects “good faith”
actors from protracted litigation and the continued access to the broader Delaware case law in
general.
343. The Delaware Chancery Court has dealt with some legitimately fraudulent foreign-based
companies. Deutsch v. ZST Digital Networks, Inc., No. CV 8014-VCL, 2018 WL 3005822, at *1
(Del. Ch. June 14, 2018) (dealing with two senior corporate officers from a Delaware corporation—
whom principally did business in China—that, upon voluntary delisting from the NASDAQ
following the resignation of its auditors on claims of alleged obstruction, failed to comply with a
default judgment entered on a stockholder’s demand to inspect books and records). See generally
David Graff & Shveta Kakar, Chinese Companies “Going Dark”: Finally Accountable to U.S.
Hedge Funds and Other Shareholders, HEDGE FUND L. REP. (Feb. 13, 2014),
https://www.hflawreport.com/2547031/chinese-companies-going-dark—finally-accountable-to-us-hedge-funds-and-other-shareholders.thtml (explaining the practice and consequences of a
publicly-traded company “going dark”).
344. See supra notes 297–319 and accompanying text.
345. See Manesh, supra note 338, at 212 (“The judicial opinions that result from frequent
litigation benefit all members of the Delaware network, because such opinions provide firms with
interpretive guidance on matters of Delaware corporate law.”).
346. Fisch, supra note 287, at 1078.
347. See supra notes 297–319 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
In Hughes v. Hu,348 the Delaware Chancery Court noted that the Kandi
board of directors did not implement nor maintain sufficient board-level
oversight controls for the company’s accounting practices or related-party
transactions.349 The court correctly held that the Kandi board of directors
faced a substantial threat of liability under Caremark and denied the board’s
motion to dismiss the shareholder derivative suit.350
But the court’s holding will likely exacerbate the current trend of
foreign-based companies avoiding Delaware as their place of
incorporation.351 The decline in foreign-companies incorporating following
Hughes will likely decrease Delaware franchise tax revenues,352 and signal
to other foreign-based companies that viable and attractive alternatives to
Delaware’s corporate governance rules are available.353 Jurisdictions such as
the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands have already begun
developing favorable legal protections for companies that operate in nonAmerican markets by establishing specialized business courts, staffed with
qualified business law jurists, aimed at resolving complex corporate law
questions.354
Delaware precedent seems to create no room for the courts to consider
non-American corporate governance styles when determining Caremark
liability;355 however, the General Motors and Puda Coal duology marks a
dormant thinking within the Delaware Chancery Court that the “successful
operation” of a company varies depending on the company’s primary
marketplace.356 Therefore, in an effort to achieve a more equitable and
business-friendly approach, Delaware courts should allow for “territorial

348. C.A. No. 2019-0112-JTL, slip op. (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2020).
349. See supra Section I.B.
350. Hughes, slip op. at 37–38.
351. Moon, supra note 247, at 20 tbl.1 (showing that between 1985 and 2016 the ratio of
Delaware to Foreign-nation incorporation of American-listed foreign corporations shifted from
roughly 2:1 to 1:5).
352. Governor’s Budget Financial Summary and Charts, DEL. OFF. OF MGMT. AND BUDGET
(last visited Feb.
13,
2020), https://budget.delaware.gov/budget/fy2020/documents/
operating/financial-summary.pdf (estimating revenues from incorporation revenues to be 27.6% of
all revenues for the fiscal year 2020).
353. See supra notes 268 & 278 and accompanying text.
354. See supra note 268; Moon, supra note 246, at 1423, 1437–43 (detailing the creation and
effects of “specialized business courts in offshore jurisdictions that supply the judicial infrastructure
necessary to handle complex corporate law disputes”).
355. See supra Section IV.A.
356. See supra notes 313–319 and accompanying text.
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adjustments” in determining the acceptable level of oversight for companies
that primarily do business in non-American markets.357

357. See supra Section IV.C.

